Language ability may not only affect the earnings of the individual, but the probability to participate in the labor market or becoming employed as well. It may also affect selection of people into economic sectors and occupation. In this paper the effects of language ability on earnings are analyzed for foreigners in Germany with joint consideration of up to four types of self-selection. The results show that language proficiency significantly increases participation and employment probability and affects earnings directly. However, when self-selection into economic sectors and occupation is regarded, the direct effects of language ability on earnings vanish.
Introduction
Earnings of foreigners have been extensively studied since the seminal paper of Chiswick (1978) .
A well-established finding of most of the works is that migrants' earnings usually lack behind those of the equally-qualified and experienced native population, catching up at a later stage.
One explanation for this gap are language difficulties of the migrants. There is a vast international evidence that speaking the language of the host country fluently has significant positive effects on earnings, see, e.g., Chiswick, Lee, and Miller (2005) for Australia, Chiswick and Miller (1999) for the United States, Shields and Price (2002) for the United Kingdom, Berman, Lang, and Siniver (2000) for Israel, and Dustmann and van Soest (2002) for Germany among others. 1 However, evaluating the impact of language ability on earnings may be complicated for the following reasons: First, self-selection issues may play an important role for migrants' earnings. For example, Chiswick, Lee, and Miller (2005) show that controlling for self-selection may weaken the significance of the language variable. Language ability may also affect the participation decision and occupation choice. In that sense, even in the absence of wage discrimination due to language proficiency there could be discrimination in terms of labor market participation, employment or choice of economic sector and occupation. Neglecting those aspects when analyzing the impact of language ability on earnings might lead to severely biased estimates.
A second complication may arise from measurement or misclassification errors in the language ability variable. In most surveys, people are asked to self-assess the language fluency. Hence, inter-personal (and even intra-personal) comparability may be limited, see, e.g., Dustmann and van Soest (2001) .
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the impact of language ability on earnings for foreigners.
In the theoretical model individuals with better language skills are more likely to participate and to be employed even in the absence of a language premium in wages. Moreover, more proficient individuals end up working in higher-paying firms. In this paper, we consider the different stages of self-selection explicitly. Namely, we take account of self-selection into the labor market as well as self-selection into employment. As both decisions may be correlated we estimate both decisions simultaneously in a first step. However, modeling selection into employment as a whole may veil potentially relevant patterns of economic sector and occupation choice. Therefore, in an extension of the model we estimate the effect of language ability on earnings regarding selfselection into economic sectors and occupation.
For the empirical application, data from eight waves of the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) for the years 1996 to 2005 (excluding the years 2002 and 2004 due to missing information on language usage) are used. All persons with a foreign citizenship are considered in the analysis and estimations are carried out for the full sample. 2 However, a rising number of people possessing foreign citizenship is born in Germany (so-called second generation). To test the sensitivity of the estimates of language usage we carry out separate estimations for first and second generation foreigners in addition. To circumvent the problem of measurement error in language ability, we use information on language usage in the household as a proxy for language command. We do not use the self-assessed language proficiency variable that is available in GSOEP since it suffers from much variation from interview to interview of the same respondent, and thus, we consider it to be less reliable.
Our empirical results show that language proficiency significantly increases participation and employment probability of foreigners in Germany. Moreover, earnings are clearly higher for persons speaking mainly or at least partly German in the household compared to people using the native language only. When additional selection into economic sector and type of occupation is considered, language usage appears to be relevant for both choices as well. However, the direct effect of language usage on earnings becomes insignificant. For that reason, we conclude that language ability is an important determinant for the selection processes in the labor market, but there is no discrimination in earnings associated with it.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the theoretical model with flat wages within each firm. Section 3 discusses selection issues and the econometric model. Details on the data and some selected descriptives are given in section 4. The empirical estimates of language usage, participation, employment and earnings are discussed in section 5. The final section concludes.
Theoretical Background
The central question of the paper is the effect of language proficiency on earnings, participation and employment. We assume here that language ability is related to productivity and through this affects earnings, participation and employment. The variant of the Burdett and Mortensen (1998) model (see also Manning, 2003 , Mortensen, 2003 laid out in this section provides argumentation for controlling for self-selection even if an employer pays the same wage for workers with different language abilities.
Consider an economy consisting of three types of individuals with productivities p 0 , p 1 , and p 2 , such that p 0 < p 1 < p 2 . Suppose that there is a guaranteed minimal income b (for example social or welfare assistance). The lowest possible wage a firm can set is thus b. Suppose that p 0 < b.
This implies that no firm employs individuals with productivity p 0 and they do not participate. 3 The inflow of job offers to unemployed workers happens in continuous time according to a stationary Poisson process so that each worker receives only one offer at maximum during an Germany, see e.g. Aldashev, Gernandt, and Thomsen (2007) , additional information would be of great value for future research.
infinitesimal time interval . Employed workers may search on the job for higher paid vacancies.
The arrival rates of job offers to employed and unemployed workers are assumed to be equal.
Since the arrival rates are the same for out-of-job and on-the-job search, it is optimal for a worker to accept the first offer she receives and to continue searching on the job for a better offer (if returns to search are higher than the search costs). As a result in equilibrium there will still be a fraction of highly productive workers employed at low-wage firms.
Suppose that there is a flat wage policy in any firm, so that a firm that hires both p 1 and p 2 workers pays equal wages to them. A firm offering a wage lower than p 1 can hire both p 1 and p 2 individuals, but a firm with a wage above p 1 can hire only p 2 workers. Consider an arbitrary firm 1, which offers a wage equal to b and has a profit of
where
is the labor supply of p 1 workers to firm 1 and L 1 (p 2 ) is the labor supply of p 2 workers to firm 1. A firm 2, offering a wage w greater than p 1 , has a profit of π 2 = (p 2 − w)L 2 (p 2 ), where
is the labor supply of p 2 workers to firm 2. Then, as in a Burdett and Mortensen (1998) model, there exists an equilibrium such that both firms are equally profitable. Firm 2 pays a higher wage, but at the same time has a larger workforce of p 2 workers as it would "steal away" some of the workers from firm 1 attracted by a higher wage. Ultimately, more p 2 workers would be concentrated in high-wage firms.
The model implies that even in the presence of a flat wage policy within a firm the observed wages in the sample between p 1 and p 2 workers would be different due to differences in employment probabilities. When estimating the effect of p on wages one has to keep in mind that p 1 workers are more likely to be unemployed than p 2 workers. Moreover, participation rates differ with p as p 0 individuals do not participate. This implies that the estimated effect of p on wages based on the sample of employed individuals is biased as the sample of employed wage-earners is self-selected and a distribution of p from a sample of employed individuals is not a correct estimate of the distribution of p from the population.
Econometric model and selection issues
To estimate the effect of language proficiency on earnings, we assume language proficiency to be related to productivity as
where H is language proficiency, ψ is some arbitrary function and υ includes other factors affecting productivity. The theoretical model is constructed in such a way to allow a flat-wage policy, i.e. a firm pays the same wage to workers with different productivities. In the empirical sense this implies that we assume firms do not discriminate workers by language proficiency with respect to earnings. However, discrimination with respect to employment might be present.
Thereby, we would expect a higher participation probability and higher employment chances of foreigners with better language command. On the other hand, according to theory, there is a critical level of productivity for participation, b. Persons with productivity below this value do not participate. Therefore, the participating individuals with a good language command could have lower values of υ as higher values of H compensate for this to reach the critical level of productivity. Moreover, one needs to keep in mind that the most productive workers are more likely to be employed in high-paid firms raising out another source of self-selection.
This implies that the effect of language ability on wages could be overestimated when the self-selection is not accounted for. In the theoretical model it was shown that the samples of participating and employed individuals may be non-random. To estimate the earnings equation
controlling for self-selection we need to model the participation and employment decisions simultaneously. To do so, we use a variant of the well-known Heckman-Lee method, according to the seminal works of Heckman (1976) and Lee (1976) . 4 The participation equation is given as:
where Z 1 is a matrix of exogenous variables, γ 1 is a parameter vector, and 1 is a random component. I * 1 is latent, instead we observe I 1 = 1 (in case of participation) if w R b and I 1 = 0 (for nonparticipating individuals) otherwise where w R means reservation wage.
The employment equation is given as:
where Z 2 is a matrix of exogenous variables, γ 2 is a parameter vector, and 2 is a random component. I * 2 is latent, instead we observe I 2 = 1 (in case of employment) if w w R and I 2 = 0 (for unemployed individuals) otherwise.
Both I * 1 and I * 2 depend on the reservation wage. If Z 1 and Z 2 contain all variables which determine w R , 1 and 2 are independent. If some of these variables are not observed (or not contained) in the data they will be included in the error term, which could result in the correlation between 1 and 2 . Hence, it might be advisable to allow for this correlation and estimate equations 2 and 3 jointly.
Finally, the wage offer equation is of a standard Becker-Mincer type:
where X is a matrix of exogenous variables, β is a parameter vector, w is a log wage, and u is an error component, which is normally distributed with mean zero. Wages are observed if both I 1 = 1 and I 2 = 1. Hence, expected observed wage is given by:
Define the covariance between the error terms of the participation and the earnings equation as σ u1 = cov(u, 1 ), and analogously between employment and earnings σ u2 = cov(u, 2 ). Moreover, let var(u) = σ 2 u . In order to estimate the selection model, variances of the error terms have to be standardized as var( 1 ) = var( 2 ) = 1 and cov( 1 , 2 ) = ρ. Following Mohanty (2001) (see also Maddala, 1983 ), E(u|I 1 = 1, I 2 = 1) = σ u1 λ 1 +σ u2 λ 2 , where
. φ is the univariate standard normal density function, Φ is the univariate standard normal distribution function, and F is the bivariate standard normal distribution function.
It is worth noting that the λs are the familiar inverse Mill's ratios adjusted for the bivariate case. In fact, if participation and employment decisions are unrelated then F (Z 1 γ 1 , Z 2 γ 2 ; ρ) = Φ(A) · Φ(B) (conditional probability of independent events) and hence λ 1 = φ(Z 1 γ 1 )/Φ(Z 1 γ 1 ) and λ 2 = φ(Z 2 γ 2 )/Φ(Z 2 γ 2 ), which are the inverse Mill's ratios in a standard two-stage Heckit model, see Heckman (1979) .
The conditional wage in equation 5 can be rewritten as:
To estimate equation 6, in a first step equations 2 and 3 have to be estimated jointly. Estimates obtained at the first stage (γ 1 , γ 2 , ρ) are used to construct λ 1 and λ 2 as defined above. At the second stage wage is regressed on X, λ 1 and λ 2 by OLS (as in the Heckman-Lee method), which produces the parameter estimates β, σ u1 , and σ u2 .
Data and Descriptives

Dataset
To analyze the effect of language ability on earnings, labor market participation and employment we use data on foreigners in West Germany from eight waves of the German Socio-Economic abroad, can be identified. In addition to the full sample of foreigners we will carry out separate estimations for first and second generation migrants to enable a more comprehensive analysis on the role of language proficiency.
Variables for language proficiency are prone to measurement error due to self-assessment of the respondents in many surveys. For example, Dustmann and van Soest (2001) show that reliability of the language proficiency variable in GSOEP may be limited in terms of inter-personal and intra-personal comparability. The language spoken in the household is also not free from interpersonal variation. However, in about half of observations for foreigners the language ability is not reported, which makes language spoken in the household preferable for our analysis not to significantly reduce the sample size of foreigners. Raw descriptive statistics reveals a strong relationship between language proficiency and language usage in the household, suggesting that language spoken in the household could be a good proxy for language proficiency. For example, 57 percent of people who speak mainly German at home report to have "very good" speaking ability (in German), more than 90 percent report at least "good" speaking ability. More than 40 percent of those who speak partly German at home report to have "good" speaking ability and over 30 percent report "satisfactory" speaking ability. Persons speaking mostly mother tongue at home mostly report "satisfactory" (about 40%) and "poor" (about 35%).
This variable categorizes language use of the respondents into three categories: speaking mainly German, speaking mainly the language of the home country or speaking partly German and partly the mother tongue. As it could be expected that reporting the type of the language used in the household is easier than assessing language proficiency in terms of written or oral skills, we suppose the variable to be much less prone to measurement errors. 6
As mentioned above, GSOEP provides information on labor market states of non-participation, employment and unemployment. Moreover, information on employment is not limited to jobs subject to social security contributions, but also covers civil servants and self-employed. It also covers details about part-time, full-time employment or whether the individuals has a minor job only. Unfortunately, even with this information at hand, modeling the two-stage self-selection process requires some further treatment of the variables. Respondents are asked two separate questions, whether they are registered unemployed and whether they are non-participants. However, non-participation is not necessarily understood by respondents as being out of the labor market in an economic sense (some people mix up non-participation and registered unemployment). For that reason, we define people as non-participants if they responded "not in the labor market" and "not registered as unemployed" simultaneously. It has to be noted that this group might still include some active participants who are not registered at the labor office. 7 A further complication arises from the fact that respondents do not necessarily understand employment and unemployment as exclusive labor market states. For example, a person having a low-paid 6 It may be useful to note that on average about two thirds to three quarters of the respondents answer equally in consecutive waves. Moreover, there is no reason to expect "changers" to correct wrong answers, but to report changes in language usage that actually occurred.
7 Potential reasons could be, for example, expiration of unemployment benefits eligibility or benefit sanctions.
7 job 8 is eligible for receiving additional subsistence allowance. Officially registered unemployed are allowed to hold a minor job or work part-time and earn up to a certain threshold. In the empirical application, unemployed people who are registered at the labor office but earn more than 1,000 Euro per month are counted as employed. The outcome variable (real gross hourly wage) is obtained for all employees including the self-employed by dividing the gross earnings in the month prior to the interview by the reported working hours of the last week that are extrapolated to monthly hours. Wages are deflated using the consumption price index based on the year 2000 to get real consumption wages of comparable purchasing power. 9
Furthermore, the sample is restricted to foreigners who arrived in West Germany after 1948.
German resettlers possessing foreign citizenship are excluded from the analysis. Moreover, due to sample size considerations, workers in the agricultural sector are dropped. For reasons of homogeneity, we only consider people aged 25 to 55 years to avoid bias due to education or early retirement decisions (those in education are explicitly discarded from our data). Individuals who do not report the language usage in the household are excluded from the sample (less than 2 percent). Finally, information on wages is symmetrically two percent trimmed to exclude extreme values. In GSOEP, foreigners could leave the sample for two reasons. First, there is some common panel mortality, i.e. persons decide not to participate in subsequent interviews or they change their place of residence and interviewers lose track of them. Second, foreigners could be naturalized. Assuming that panel mortality in GSOEP is random, naturalization could be assumed to be non-random. In the data, 201 foreigners out of 2,230 became Germans during the observation period. Performing distribution tests of equality of language usage for "changers"
and "non-changers" showed no significant differences. Hence, we could refrain for controlling for selection into German citizenship explicitly in the analysis. 10
Selected Descriptives
Before presenting the empirical application and the estimation results, it is useful to take a closer look on the data in use. Table 1 provides means of selected variables used in the empirical models with a distinction between full sample (left panel) and first (center) and second generation (right panel) foreigners. Each panel contains three columns, of which the left one provides information on non-participants in the labor market, the center one for participants who are unemployed and the right column refers to means for the sample of employed foreigners. As becomes obvious from the table, the sample for the second generation is quite small compared to that of the first generation. Hence, results for the full sample in analysis are strongly determined by the first generation.
8 with earnings below the subsistence level 9 It should be noted that the reported gross earnings in the month prior to the interview have not been adjusted for end-of-year bonuses, overtime-payments, holiday allowances etc.
10 It should be noted that persons who were naturalized are not considered in the estimations after the date of naturalization. Instead of discussing the single figures in the table, we will concentrate on findings that are useful for our analysis. First, compared to the other groups employed individuals are more likely to speak mainly German at home than their mother tongue. Whereas about 40 percent of the group of non-participants speak the language of their home country at home, in the group of the employed the share is about 18 percent only (for the full sample). Regarding the results for the first and second generation, this discrepancy is more pronounced in the parents' generation.
People of the second generation use German far more frequently at home.
Another finding worth to mention refers to gender differences between the three different states.
The vast majority of non-participating foreigners in Germany are women (82 percent). Within the sample of participants, the share of women is clearly lower. Within the group of unemployed foreigners, about 46 percent and in the group of employed persons only 39 percent are females.
Including the distinct results for first and second generation foreigners, the picture does not change by far. Even though inactivity of women of the first generation is a bit more pronounced, also for the second generation the share of females in that group is about two thirds.
We consider the level of education in three different categories. The low-skilled are people who lack professional training. This group should be expected to be most strongly disadvantaged in the labor market, in particular in a highly developed country with a regulated labor market as Germany. Medium-skilled comprises people who finished a professional training (not necessarily in the German apprenticeship system, but comparable to it). Finally, the high-skilled are those who graduated from advanced technical college (Fachhochschule) or university. The shares of the low-skilled are particularly large in the group of non-participants (about 65 percent of that group) and the group of unemployed persons (about 61 percent). In contrast, less than half of the employed persons are low skilled (47 percent). Although the share of low-skilled is smaller in the group of employed it is still considerable. However, as many un-and low-skilled foreigners were recruited during the 1960s and early 1970s to reduce labor supply shortage this result is not surprising. In contrast, the qualification of the second generation is on average higher. For this group, the majority of the employed is at least medium-skilled, while the number of low-skilled is less than one third. 11
The last point we want to discuss is the selection into economic sectors. Naturally, this information is only observable for people who are actually employed. The figures from Table 1 clarify the generational differences. Whereas more than half of the first generation (and, therefore, the full sample) work in industry and about one quarter in trading services, the composition has changed slightly in the second generation. Here, the share of people employed in industry is still high with about 41 percent, but lower than in their parents' generation. Though the proportion working in trading services is comparable (26 percent) with the first generation, for transportation the share is more than twice as large.
Results
Selection Models
To answer the question what impact language ability has on foreigners' earnings, we will start our discussion with the results for the selection models. As shown in the set-up of the empirical model, individual's decisions about participation in the labor market and employment may be correlated. Hence, in a first step we estimate both decisions jointly using full-information maximum likelihood. The results of these estimations using three different specifications (Spec. A to Spec. C) are given in Table 2 for the full sample. 12
For identification purposes, we choose marital status (married) and children (children) as the exclusion restrictions that enter the decision to participate, but not the employment decision.
The variables of language usage are regarded in both equations. Effects are estimated for dummies for speaking mainly and speaking partly German at home with speaking mother tongue as a reference group. Moreover, to improve explanatory power, some socio-economic variables are added to the models. In particular, person's age and time of residence (i.e. the years the individual lives in Germany) as well as the squares are considered in both equations. To take account of gender differences, we incorporated a dummy for sex, taking value 1 for females (woman).
As productivity is closely related to qualification, we estimate the effect of medium-or highqualification in reference to low-qualification. Finally, year dummies for the waves are regarded in all three specifications to capture macroeconomic and composition effects. Specifications B and C differ from the basic specification in the number of interactions included. In B, we additionally take into account interactions between skills and language usage with gender and age. C extends the model to consider a number of interactions for the year dummies and language usage with education level. However, including these interactions does not provide great advantage in terms of precision of the estimates. For that reason, we rely on the more parsimonious specification B for the estimations of the second-stage (earnings equation, see below). 13 Particular interest should be devoted to the coefficient of correlation (ρ) in the joint model.
In all three specifications presented in Table 2 , the estimate is insignificant. For that reason, both decisions could be estimated separately using univariate probit models. The results of the separate models are given in Table 3 . 14 The estimates of the language variables clearly point towards a positive relationship between usage of the host country's language and both the decision to participate in the labor market and the employment chances. Although coefficients in the Tables can not be interpreted as marginal effects, it becomes obvious from the scale that 12 In addition, Tables A.1 and A.2 in the appendix provide the results for the estimations for first and second generation. However, for the sake of brevity and some convergence problems for the second generation, we refrain from a in-depth discussion. Nevertheless, those results could be regarded in order illustrating differences between generations.
13 In order to obtain the "best" specification, we carried out a quite extensive testing of different specifications. Decisions were made using tests of (joint) significance for single variables, groups of variables and the whole set.
14 In addition, the estimation results for first and second generation are given in Tables A.1 and A.2 for joint  estimation and Tables 3 and A.4 for separate estimation in the appendix. speaking mainly German has an even stronger effect than using it only partly. Taking a look at the variables used as the exclusion restrictions indicates that marriage has a positive effect on participation whereas having children is insignificant at first sight. However, taking into account interactions, particularly with gender, there is an indication that married men are more likely to participate in the labor market than the singles; however, for females the reverse is true.
Tab
Moreover, having children reduces participation of foreign women as well. These findings may pinpoint to traditional attitudes of the foreign population in Germany. Men are the primary earners, while women carry out household duties and child care with financial support of their With respect to the other variables, most findings are in line with the expectations. Results establish positive, but concave relationships between individual's age and time of residence and participation and employment. With respect to the level of education, medium-skilled people experience a higher propensity to participate than the low-skilled. Maybe due to the small number of foreigners who are high-skilled, estimations do not provide evidence that those differ in their behavior from the low-skilled in terms of participation. In contrast, high-skilled have a significant higher probability with respect to employment.
The Impact of Language Usage on Earnings
Given the results from the joint estimation of the selection model, there is no need to assume a joint dependence of foreigners' earnings on the participation and the employment decisions.
Nevertheless, neglecting self-selection at all in the earnings equation could lead to biased estimates bearing in mind the explanatory power of the separate models. To consider self-selection in terms of participation and employment in the earnings equation, we calculate both inverse Mill's ratios based on the results from specification B given in Table 3 Table 4 .
Starting with the estimates for the terms of self-selection into labor market participation (λ 1 ) and employment (λ 2 ), differences between the three samples in analysis could be drawn. For the full sample, only the factor controlling for self-selection into participation is significantly different from zero with a negative sign. Although larger in size, the parameter for self-selection into employment is of no statistical significance. In contrast, the estimates for the more homogeneous first generation sample are more pronounced. Here, both terms have significant influence on foreigners' earnings.
The estimates show that being more familiar with host' countries language lead to higher earnings. Speaking mainly German, for example, lead on average to 14.03 percent (full sample) higher earnings than speaking mainly mother tongue at home. Even using German partly at home coincides with an earnings' increase of about 8.07 percent compared to the reference group. These differences are even stronger for the first generation. Here, those who speak mainly German earn on average about 15.08 percent more than people using their home country's language in the household. Also when using German language only partly at home, earnings are about 8.64 percent higher. The estimates for the second generation are somewhat contra-intuitive.
Speaking mainly German has no significant effect while speaking partly German results in lower earnings than speaking the language of the country of citizenship. However, given the clearly smaller number of observations the estimates should not be overrated.
The results presented are comparable with other studies. Dustmann (1994) finds a 15.3 percent wage increase for females and a 7.3 percent increase for males who report to have good or very good writing abilities in German language. Chiswick and Miller (1999) Medium-skilled, i.e. people having completed a professional training, earn about 8.33 (7.76 first generation) percent more than low-skilled; high-skilled, i.e. those having an advanced technical college (Fachhochschule) or university degree, earn even 20.46 (18.74) percent more. The reason for the smaller earnings differences in the first generation may be due to the composition of this group. As mentioned before, first generation immigrants were recruited as unskilled or low-skilled labor to reduce labor supply shortages in West Germany during the 1960s and early 1970s. As this group has been employed for a long time, people's human capital was appreciated over the years without formal attestation; consequently, wages increased over the years to levels above that of the average unskilled or low-skilled worker. Choice of the economic sector seems to be relatively ineffective with respect to earnings except when foreigners work in the trading sector. Compared to working in industry and manufacturing this leads to about 9 to 9.5 percent lower earnings. The firm size plays a more important role in wage setting as the results reveal Apart from the minor problems for the second generation, we could recapitulate the (intermediate) findings as follows: the results for the full sample and the sample of the first generation clearly indicate that speaking German is important for foreigners not only for the decision whether to supply labor or becoming employed, but for the resulting earnings, too. Hence, improving the command of German language for foreigners is important in order to increase earnings and, therefore, social security contributions and taxes. Moreover, as the results from the selection models indicate, particularly women speaking their native languages at home refrain from participating in the labor market. Improving the command of German language for this group may provide a further potential of productivity to the economy.
Considering Self-Selection into Economic Sector and Occupation
Theory predicts that workers with higher productivity enter higher paid jobs. Therefore, even though controlling for self-selection into participation and employment, earnings may be affected by worker's choice for type of occupation and economic sector. Therefore, we extend our model to explicitly control for selection through these channels. Using the sub-sample of employed, we take account of self-selection in the economic sector modeled as the probability of working in a basic or high-tech industry and of self-selection in occupation choice modeled as the probability of being a qualified/highly-qualified white-collar worker. Analogously to our empirical model discussed in section 3, both choices are considered as joint decisions in a first step. Assuming joint normality of the errors, estimation is carried out using a bivariate probit model.
In the extended model, the selection terms for participation (λ 1 ) and employment (λ 2 ) estimated in the first stage are considered as auxiliary variables in the bivariate probit. The extended earnings equation (Eq. 6), is augmented by the two auxiliary selectivity variables capturing economic sector choice (λ 3 ) and type of occupation (λ 4 ):
The additional parameters λ 3 and λ 4 are calculated analogously to the λ 1 and λ 2 using the estimates of the type of occupation and economic sector choice equations.
The results of the bivariate probit model on type of occupation and economic sector choice are given in Table 5 distinguishing full sample and first and second generation. The estimate for the correlation coefficient (ρ) is highly significant for the full sample and the first generation; hence, both choices have to be estimated jointly to avoid selection bias. For the second generation, a similar result could not be established. However, bearing the already mentioned arguments for the sample of the second generation in mind, we should not pay too much attention to these estimates. With respect to the variables on language ability, the picture is mixed. On the one hand, foreigners speaking mainly German at home have a clearly higher probability to be white-collar workers, on the other hand, they have lower chances of working in industry and manufacturing (in general highly paid industries). For the latter choice, even speaking German at home partly reduces the probability compared to speaking only mother tongue. Becoming a white-collar worker is more probable for high-skilled individuals. Interestingly, women are more likely to fill white-collar positions than men. In addition, people with a medium education level in Germany are less likely than the low-skilled to work in industry and manufacturing.
With these estimates at hand we calculate two further auxiliary terms capturing selection into economic sector (λ 3 ) and type of occupation (λ 4 ) non-linearly and augment the earnings equation as stated above. Table 6 provides the corresponding results. To check the sensitivity of the estimates, along with the results for the full specification a more parsimonious model (without taking into account employment status and several interactions) and a model without additional selection terms are presented. In the parsimonious model, neither the coefficients for the language terms nor that of the selection into industry and occupation terms are significant.
However, the dummy variables for language and selection into industry and occupation terms are jointly significant; hence, we cannot drop all four of them from the model. It should be noted that dropping the language variables leads to significant estimates for the selection into industry and occupation terms. On the other hand, disregarding selection into industry and occupation gives language dummies statistical significance. These results make it difficult to say whether language ability affects earnings directly or indirectly, which is in contrast to the basic model (see Table 4 ) indicating a direct effect. However, it is in line with the theoretical considerations laid out in section 2. If we have non-discriminating firms, no wage premium due to language usage could be expected. This implies that language affects the choice of occupation and economic sector as well as, more fundamentally, decisions about participation and employment but not wages per se. Hence, the significant effect of language in Table 4 is likely to be an indirect effect of language usage on earnings through occupation and economic sector choice.
Tab Table 3 . λ 3 and λ 4 are calculated using estimates for the economic sector and type of occupation equation as shown in Table 5 .
Conclusion
There is a quite comprehensive international evidence showing that foreigners speaking the language of the host country well are better off in terms of earnings than those with only a poor 19
command. However, issues of self-selection are often neglected and, thereby, effects of language on earnings may be overestimated. Moreover, estimates may suffer from inaccurate measures of language ability based on self-assessed survey information. In this study, the effects of language ability on earnings are analyzed for foreigners in Germany taking account of various dimensions of selection, i.e. labor market participation, employment, choice of economic sector and type of occupation. Problems of the language ability measure are circumvented by using the easier (and therefore more accurately) self-reported information on language usage in the household.
Based upon theoretical considerations that assume that no wage premium due to language could be expected in a world of non-discriminating firms, we provide empirical evidence based on data from GSOEP. Starting with a basic model that takes account of two channels of self-selection regarding labor market participation and employment, the effects of language ability on earnings are estimated. The results show that language ability is a relevant determinant both for labor market participation and employment as well. In addition, foreigners who speak mainly German in the household receive on average about 14 percent higher wages compared to those using the native language at home. Hence, the results clarify that language ability is an important and valuable asset not only for integration, but also for prosperity. In a second step, we extend the model to capture selection patterns into economic sector and type of occupation as theory predicts high productive workers to fill high-paid positions. Again, for both decisions language ability is crucial, although the picture is reverted. Whereas using German in the household as the main language increases the probability for foreigners to be high-qualified white-collar workers, this reduces the probability for working in industry and manufacturing. When the earnings equation is augmented with two additional variables to control for these selection patterns, no direct effects of language ability on earnings can be established anymore. Hence, language ability only indirectly affects foreigners' earnings in Germany, but is a major determinant of the various selection processes.
The analysis distinguishing first and second generation provides only a first approach and shows that second generation immigrants use German more frequently in the household. Unfortunately, no clear effects for this groups could be found. Hence, further research on the effects of language ability on earnings for the second generation migrants is needed. However, for that purpose more detailed and comprehensive information than that provided in GSOEP is required. The main finding of the paper clearly indicates that improving the command of the German language for foreigners should be a major item on the public agenda in order to increase labor market and economic integration of this group. In this context, a particular focus should be given to foreign women speaking only native languages at home. Although the government offers language courses, the use and usefulness of these measures should be evaluated thoroughly.
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A Appendix e Dummy that which takes value one, if language spoken at home is mainly German. f Dummy that which takes value one, if language spoken at home is partly German.
